Attorney and Client--Negligence of an Attorney in Preparation of a Will by Vest, Walter D.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 21 | Issue 1 Article 12
1932
Attorney and Client--Negligence of an Attorney in
Preparation of a Will
Walter D. Vest
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation




be brought or sued out from any court of equity hereafter obtained,
granting a divorce from the marriage contract" Thornberry v. Thorn-
berry, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 251 (1823), Maguzre v. Maguire. 7 Dana (Ky.) 181
(1838), Pence v. Pence, 6 B. Monroe (Ky.) 496 (1846). Perhaps the
reason for the enactment of 1816 was the inconvenience that might re-
sult from annulling a valid divorce upon a writ of error which might
be prosecuted after one of the divorced parties had contracted another
marriage; but that reason does not apply to a void divorce, which could
never legalize a subsequent marriage of either of the parties.
Kentucky Statutes, Section 950-1, provides " but no appeal
shall be taken to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right from a
judgment for the recovery of nor to reverse a judgment grant-
ing a divorce " This statute expressly forbids the Court of
Appeals to reverse a judgment granting a divorce, although it may
review the judgment in a divorce case in other respects. Shehan v.
Shehan, 152 Ky. 191, 153 S. W 243 (1913). According to the prevailing
Kentucky view, it is not only the right, but the duty of the court to
review the evidence where the mind is left in doubt on issues of fact
involving alimony, or the custody and maintenance of children. Evans
v. Evans, 229 Ky. 20, 16 S. W (2d) 485 (1929), or to determine
whether the property rights of the parties have been properly ad-
justed. Pleasnick v. Pleasnck, 215 Ky. 281, 284 S. W 1070 (1926).
BET HOWARD.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-NEGLIGENCE OF AN ATTORNEY IN PREPARA-
TION OF A WuLL.-In the recent case of Schtrmer v. Nethercutt, 157
Wash. 172, 288 Pac, 265, decided in 1930, the plaintiff employed the de-
fendant attorney to draw a will for the grandmother of the plaintiff.
The will was duly prepared in accordance with the instructions given
by the grandmother. By the terms of the will plaintiff was a legatee
and was to receive one-half of the residue of her estate. The defend-
ant carelessly allowed plaintiff to witness the will thereby causing
plaintiff to lose his one-half residuary share of the estate. Held, that
since plaintiff was not permitted to take under the will he was entitled
to recover the value thereof from the person responsible for its loss
through his negligent breach of trust.
The word "attorney" is derived from the Latin word attornare
which means proxy or agent. And an attorney is essentially an agent
of and for his client, the general principles which control in matters
of agency also being applicable to attorneys. The special undertaking
of an attorney is to establish or protect the rights of his client, whether
relating to life, liberty, person, reputation or property. This neces-
sarily creates a relation of trust and confidence between them which
measures and defines the extent of the attorney's duty. The very fact
of employment is sufficient to raise between the parties a contractual
relation. Then, any controversy between them must be adjudicated
upon the basis of this contract, unless the wrong complained of is some
tortious act, actionable per se. That actions for malpractice against
an attorney are based on breach of contract has been generally recog-
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nized. See Isharn V. Parker, 3 Wash. 755, 29 Pac. 835 (Liability of
client for services not contemplated by contract.), Dundee Mortg., etc.,
Go. v. Hughes, 20 Fed. 39 (Attorney not liable to assignee of mortgagee
for error in certificate of title, the attorney having been employed by
the mortgagee.).
The court in Schsrmer v. Nethercutt, supra, recognized the con-
tractual element when it said, "it is a closed question in this state,
for we have consistently held that such actions are based on breach
of contract and controlled by statutes relating to breach of contract
relation, governed by the three-year statute of limitations"
The necessity of some contractual relation between the parties was
brought out in the case of Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900,
decided in 1895. In that case an attorney was employed by a mother
to draw a will leaving the residue of her estate, after certain specific
legacies, to her son. The attorney negligently failed to exclude cer-
tain grandchildren and also caused the son to become a subscribing
witness to the will. As a consequence the son was deprived of any
share in the estate and the son sought to hold the attorney for an
amount equal to the approximate amount that the son would otherwise
have gotten. Held, that even though the son suffered great pecuniary
loss, he could not recover from the attorney, there having been no
privity of contract between them.
The propriety of the decision in SeAsrmer v. Nethercutt, supra,
can hardly be questioned. It was the desire of the grandmother that
the plaintiff receive a portion of the estate and an attempt was made
to do so. And except for the error of the defendant the desire would
have been carried into effect. His act in causing plaintiff to witness
the will was an omission to exercise that degree of care and skill
which, for one in such a position of trust, could be characterized as
reasonable care under the cricumstances.
It cannot be contended that an attorney must know all the law.
But on the contrary, as said by Lord Tenterden, "God forbid that it
should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is
bound to know all the law; or that an attorney is to lose his fair rec-
ompense on account of an error, being such an error as a cautious
man might fall into" Montrzou v. Jefferys, 2 C. & P 113. The court
then, in considering the Schirmer case, could have asked the question:
Would a reasonably cautious attorney allow a legatee to become one of
the subscribing witnesses to a will? Surely this question could have
been answered but one way. Would anyone say that the reason for the
plaintiff's failure to receive his legacy was to be found anywhere ex-
cept m the carelessness and negligence of the attorney? It would be
extremely difficult to trace precisely the dividing line between that
reasonable skill and diligence which an attorney undertakes to furnish,
and in the exercise of which he is exonorated from liability, and that
gross negligence or failure to exercise reasonable care for which he is
undoubtedly responsible. But without attempting to make a classifica-
tion, it would seem that the Washington court was correct when it
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characterized the action of the attorney in Schzrmer v. Nethercutt as
falling in the latter class.
The law, in fixing liability on attorneys, must recognize that human
judgment is fallible. Courts, as well as lawyers, disagree concerning
the many matters about which each may have a fairly fixed opinion.
The law is truly a science, but an imperfect one, because it depends
for exemplification and application upon the imperfect judgments and
consciences of men. Therefore when a attorney has used ordinary care
in acquainting himself with the law his misjudgment as to the applica-
tion thereof should not render him liable. But where he has carelessly
failed to acquaint himself with those elementary legal principles that
are well established and clearly defined in the elementary books, or
which have been declared in adjudged cases that have been duly re-
ported and published a sufficient length of time to have become known
to those who exercise reasonable diligence in keeping pace with the
literature of the profession, then the law must say that he is liable to
those for whom he has engaged to exercise his knowledge and skill in
a professional capacity.
It is extremely difficult, if not utterly impossible, to .lay down any
general rule which should control the measure of liability in all cases.
Each case must be decided in the light of its own peculiar circum-
stances. The rule in England seems to have been that an attorney is
liable to his client only in cases of gross neglect or gross incompetence.
From an examination of the malpractice cases in this country, a juster
rule seems to exist, that the attorney is liable for the want of such skill,
care and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess
and exercise in matters of professional employment. The general rules
governing the execution of testamentary instruments have been fairly
well established by a line of cases running back past the passage of
the Statute of Wills in 1540. There seems to be no reasonable excuse
for exempting from liability an attorney who has failed to follow those
fundamental rules, with which it seems imperative that every lawyer
should, to a certain extent, become familiar.
The legal profession cannot reasonably find fault with the rules
which are generally accepted concerning liability for malpractice. These
rules are necessary, as well for the protection of the legal profession
as for the client for whom the attorney seeks to act.
WALrTER D. VEST.
JUnISDIc T -Srrus OF THE CnnrE.-A recent newspaper clipping
contained an account of the murder of A in Kentucky by B who was
standing in West Virginia when he fired the fatal shot.
The man was apprehended in West Virginia and brought up for
trial in the Wes Virginia court on the charge of murder. The judge
released the prisoner because the courts in West Virginia did not
have jurisdiction to try the prisoner for the murder committed in
another state.
The murderer will go unpunished unless he is brought to trial In
a court of Kentucky where the murder occurred. Kentucky cannot
